We experimentally test whether impartial deliberation leads to stronger concern for fairness in bargaining. In the experiment a seller can invest some of his/her time in order to generate potential gains from trade with a buyer. Conditional on investment the seller proposes how to split the gain. The buyer either accepts or rejects the seller's offer. To vary the degree of impartiality, subjects are assigned to their roles as sellers or buyers either before (the "subjective group") or after (the "objective group") they read the instructions. We find that the relationship between the perceived investment cost and the bargaining proposal is significantly stronger in the objective group. This suggests that sellers in the objective group are more preoccupied with setting a fair price.
I. INTRODUCTION
"The field of social ethics is naturally experimental." (Paul E. Johnson 1931, p. 204) It is well known that many people behave fairly. Fair behavior has been documented both in laboratory experiments (see Camerer, 2002, Chapter 3 . for an overview), and field studies (see Nagin et al. 2002 for a recent example). Less is known about the origins of fairness. Is fair behavior due to routines or to reason? If reason plays a role, how is reason triggered and for how long does it affect behavior?
Philosophers have long argued that there is a close connection between impartiality and morality. People make immoral choices because they put their own interests before the interests of others. According to many moral philosophers, people would make rather different choices if they were less self-centered. If we could just step behind a "veil of ignorance" and make our decisions not knowing in whose shoes we would later have to live, we would be compelled to make morally appealing choices (Vickrey 1945; Harsanyi 1953 Harsanyi , 1955 Rawls 1971) . Gauthier (1986) is perhaps the most openly optimistic philosopher in this respect. Briefly, his view is that exposure to impartial reasoning, like the fictional veil of ignorance, may suffice to induce fair behavior. Others, notably Binmore (1994) , are much more pessimistic, believing that moral arguments as such have little or no capacity to influence behavior.
Although the power of moral reasoning over human behavior is ultimately an empirical question, the literature is almost entirely theoretical. Moreover, most existing empirical studies of impartiality have focussed on how people rank outcomes when they are unaware of their own future position in society (see for example Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992 , Johannesson and Gerdtham 1996 , and Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002 . Instead, we address the very issue separating Gauthier and Binmore: Does impartial reasoning have the capacity to affect people's choices even after they learn in whose shoes they have ended up?
That is, do people behave more morally when they have first reasoned about matters from an impartial perspective? The answer is of course not obvious a priori. It could well be that people think morally only as long as they actually are ignorant of their own interest, and that they revert to a more partial view of the world immediately once the veil of ignorance is lifted. For example, it is easy for a neutral observer to proclaim the merits of an equal split in bargaining. A monopoly seller, aware of the moral argument, may nonetheless feel tempted to exploit the bargaining advantage.
Sticking as closely as possible to Gauthier and Binmore, we investigate the relationship between impartiality and fairness in the context of a bilateral bargaining experiment. According to Gauthier (1986, Chapter 5) , the fair outcome of bilateral bargaining is that each party is fully compensated for his or her contribution and that the remaining surplus is split equally between them. In the parlance of Gauthier, this is the "Archimedean point" that should appeal to an impartial spectator. To find out whether impartial deliberation prior to bargaining makes negotiators behave more morally, we need to vary the degree of impartial deliberation. We must also consider a bargaining situation that invites departures from the fair outcome. Therefore, we study an asymmetric bargaining game. Only one agent contributes to the generation of surplus, and the contributor also has more bargaining power than the opponent. In earlier work we have shown that these two asymmetries by themselves are not enough to foster major departures from the fair outcome, because bargaining proposals that are obviously unfair are often rejected (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2002a) . To avoid confounding fair intentions and fear of punishment, we let contributions be time rather than money. The resulting ambiguity about contribution costs implies that only the contributor knows the fair outcome, whence fair proposals are due to fair intentions.
Let us now describe the experiment in more detail. We study a situation in which a seller makes a binary decision to invest some of his/her time. If the seller makes the investment, the parties bargain over how to divide the gains from trade. The gains are monetary, amounting to SEK 100, or about 11 US dollars (SEK=Swedish Kronor). In the negotiation, the seller proposes a division of the gains from trade (a price) and the buyer accepts or rejects this division. If the buyer accepts, both get paid according to the proposal; if the responder rejects, both get nothing. Both parties know the size of the gains and the amount of time that the seller has to invest. Of course, only the seller knows what is his or her opportunity cost of time. In order to elicit an estimate of this opportunity cost, both the sellers and the buyers are asked to evaluate the investment cost (this evaluation is made before the investment decision). Finally, we vary the degree of impartiality by assigning subjects to their roles as sellers or buyers either before they read the instructions (the "subjective group") or after (the "objective group").
In our setting, a fair deal is to split the net gain equally after deducting the seller's cost, i.e. a fair proposal is (100-I)/2+I=50+I/2, where I is the perceived investment cost. For a completely selfish seller, a "payoff maximizer", the proposal should be unrelated to the investment cost. Thus, our main objective is to investigate whether the sensitivity of the seller's proposal to the investment cost varies across the two treatments.
Our experiment shows that the relationship between the perceived investment cost and the bargaining proposal is significantly stronger in the objective group. In the objective group the proposals increase by about 0.2 for every SEK 1 increase in the perceived investment cost.
(While 0.2 is quite a bit lower than the coefficient of 0.5 that a population of entirely fairminded agents would have produced, we argue below that the estimated coefficient might be downward biased.) In the subjective group the proposals are essentially unrelated to the perceived investment cost. Mean proposals are very similar in the two groups. The difference in proposals' cost-sensitivity across treatments therefore strongly suggests that sellers in the objective group are more preoccupied with setting a fair price.
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In the experiment two individuals in different rooms form a pair. One subject (the seller) in a pair first decides whether to carry out an investment or not. The investment consists of staying for a quarter of an hour after the end of the experiment to complete a questionnaire.
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Before the investment decision both subjects in a pair are asked to assess the investment cost in monetary terms. If the investment is carried out, a SEK 100 gain from trade is created and the seller and the other individual in the pair (the buyer) bargain over how to divide the SEK 100 between them (SEK=Swedish Kronor; $1≈SEK 10). Bargaining is carried out as an ultimatum game with the seller as proposer and the buyer as responder.
To vary the degree of impartiality we implement two experimental treatments. In one treatment subjects learn their roles before they read the instructions and in the other treatment subjects learn their roles after they have read the instructions and assessed the investment cost. Our subjects were recently enrolled undergraduate business and economics students at the Stockholm School of Economics. They were not paid a participation fee, but were told that they could earn between SEK 0 and SEK 100 in the experiment. A total of 250 subjects participated in the experiment, forming 125 bargaining pairs. Five sessions were carried out with about 25 bargaining pairs in each session (three sessions with treatment I and two sessions with treatment II). The two experimental treatments, referred to as the "subjective group" and the "objective group" in the text, are described in more detail below.
Treatment I (The subjective group; learned roles before reading the instructions and assessing the investment cost)
The subjects are recruited to two different rooms (called room A and room B in the instructions). In each room subjects are given a number between 1 and N, where N is the number of students in the room, and subjects with identical numbers form a pair. Anonymity is maintained throughout. The subjects are given the instructions and are asked to read them (the complete instructions are reproduced in the Appendix). They are allowed to ask clarifying questions to the experimenter, but not publicly. At the beginning of the instructions the subjects are told whether they are in room A or room B.
After the subjects have read the instructions they are asked to assess the cost of making an investment described in the instructions. The investment consists of staying for a quarter of an hour after the end of the experiment to complete a questionnaire. The question about the investment cost is phrased in the following way:
"What is the smallest compensation you yourself would accept to stay for a quarter of an hour after the end of the experiment to anonymously complete a questionnaire?
………………….SEK"
After the assessment question the individual in room A (the seller) decides whether he/she will carry out the investment or not. If the investment is carried out, a SEK 100 revenue is created for the pair, and the seller make a proposal of how to split the SEK 100. If the 1 The questionnaire was compiled to take about a quarter of an hour to fill out and consisted of some background individual in room B (the buyer) accepts the proposal, both individuals get paid according to the proposal. If the buyer rejects the proposal, both get nothing. After the subjects have been paid, all individuals in room B leave the room. The individuals in room A that decided not to carry out the investment also leave their room, whereas the individuals in room A that decided to carry out the investment stay for a quarter of an hour to complete a questionnaire.
Treatment II (The objective group; learned roles after reading the instructions and assessing the investment cost)
Treatment II is identical to treatment I with the exception that the subjects do not know whether they will be in room A (the seller room) or room B (the buyer room) when they read the instructions and assess the cost of making the investment. After the subjects have answered the assessment question, a lottery is carried out to determine which room is room A and room B, respectively. The complete instructions for this treatment are reproduced in the Appendix.
Statistics
We test whether the investment rate, mean bargaining proposal, the conditional acceptance rate, and the assessment of the investment cost differ between the two treatments. A contingency regression analysis is used to test if the impact of the perceived investment cost on bargaining proposals differs between the experimental groups.
III. RESULTS

Assessment of the investment cost
For completeness, we first check whether the degree of impartiality affects the investment cost assessment. In Table 1 we report the mean assessment of the investment cost for the sellers and the buyers in the two treatments. We find little evidence that the degree of partiality affects the assessment of the investment cost. The mean perceived investment cost is similar for the sellers and the buyers in the subjective group (SEK 41.64 versus SEK 44.87). The degree of impartiality has no significant effect on the investment cost assessment either. The mean perceived investment cost in the objective group is SEK 42.66 (pooling the subjects subsequently randomised to sellers or buyers as the subjects do not know their roles when making the evaluation).
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Overall behavioral results
Individual bargaining behavior
The distribution of bargaining proposals for the two treatments is shown in Figures 1 and 2 .
The modes of the distributions are similar with the most common proposal being a 60-40 split in both groups made by about a third of the sellers. There is, however, a tendency towards a greater spread in the proposals in the objective group, although the difference does not reach statistical significance (the p-value for Levene's test for equality of variances is 0.166). The proportion of proposals at SEK 50 or lower is 27% in the objective group compared to 20% in the subjective group (p=0.341) and the proportion of proposals higher than SEK 80 is 8% in the objective group compared to 1% in the subjective group (p=0.053). 5 As expected the rejection rate increases for higher proposals in both groups; for proposals higher than SEK 80 only 1 out of 5 proposals are accepted.
In Figures 3 and 4 we plot the perceived investment costs and bargaining proposals of the sellers in the subjective and the objective group. It is difficult to see any clear-cut relationship in the subjective group, whereas in the objective group there seems to be a positive relationship between the perceived investment cost and the bargaining proposal. The correlation coefficient between the perceived investment cost and the bargaining proposal is 0.033 (p=0.774) in the subjective group and 0.397 (p=0.005) in the objective group. This pattern is consistent with a stronger concern for fairness in the objective group.
The relationship between the perceived investment cost and the bargaining proposal is investigated further in the regression analysis reported in Table 3 . We include a dummy variable for the experimental group (1=subjective group), a variable for the perceived investment cost of the seller and an interaction variable between the experimental group and the perceived investment cost. 6 The constant in the regression analysis measures the bargaining proposal at zero investment cost in the objective group and the group dummy variable measures the difference in the proposals between the experimental groups at zero investment cost. The group dummy variable is significant, suggesting that the proposals are higher in the subjective group at zero investment cost, consistent with more selfish behavior in the subjective group. The predicted proposal at zero cost is about SEK 56 in the objective group and about SEK 64 in the subjective group, which can be compared with the equal split proposal of SEK 50.
The perceived investment cost variable measures the effect of the investment cost on the bargaining proposal in the objective group. This variable is significant with a coefficient of 0.2, predicting that the proposals increase with about SEK 0.2 for every SEK 1 increase in the perceived value of the investment cost (this coefficient would be equal to 0.5 if all sellers only cared about fairness). The interaction variable measures whether the effect of the perceived investment cost differs between the experimental groups. It is significant with a negative sign, suggesting that sellers in the subjective group care less about fairness. For subjects in the subjective group the proposals increase by only about 0.02 for every SEK 1 increase in the perceived investment cost, and this effect is not significantly different from 0.
According to the estimated regression function, low cost sellers in the subjective group claim more than low cost sellers in the objective group, and high cost sellers in the subjective group claim less than high cost sellers in the objective group. At the average perceived value of the sunk cost these effects cancel out, explaining why there is no difference in the mean proposals between the groups. 7
IV. DISCUSSION
A key methodological issue is to what extent we measured the perceived investment cost in an unbiased way. It is likely that we underestimated the relationship between the perceived investment cost and the proposal, because the investment cost was measured in a hypothetical question that had no implications for the earnings of the subjects in the experiment. It is relatively well established that hypothetical valuation questions tends to exaggerate the value, i.e. so called hypothetical bias (Cummings et al. 1995 (Cummings et al. , 1997 . In subsequent work we have Selfish sellers will make the perceived payoff-maximizing proposal. The relationship between the proposal and the acceptance rate in a logistic regression analysis suggest a payoff maximizing proposal of SEK 70, but our data set is too small to estimate this proposal with any precision. A relatively large fraction of subjects propose SEK 50 or less, which is well below the payoff maximizing level. Most of these subjects (13/15 in the subjective group and 9/13 in the objective group) have a positive investment cost, and these proposals cannot be explained by either fairness or payoff maximization (unless they greatly overestimate the rejection rate for higher proposals). One possibility suggested in our subsequent work Ellingsen and Johannesson (2002b) , is that a fraction of subjects are unwilling to be compensated for their time costs in social interactions.
It has been observed that the rate of disagreement in bargaining experiments increases if the scope for multiple interpretations of fairness increases (Roth and Murnighan 1982; Knez and Camerer 1995; Kagel et al. 1996; Gächter and Riedl 2001) . Individuals may subconsciously bias notions of fairness in favour of themselves, and several studies suggest that such self-serving interpretations of fairness can cause bargaining disagreements (Loewenstein et al. 1993; Babcock et al. 1995 Babcock et al. , 1996 Babcock and Loewenstein 1997) . Our experimental design share many similarities with the design of the self-serving bias experiment by Babcock et al. (1995) . In the context of pre-trial negotiations, they find that people have less self-serving notions of fairness if they first read case materials from an impartial perspective. In our experiment, we have not collected information about the subjects' assessment of fairness, partly because we wanted to avoid that sellers anchor on the elicited fair proposals, but a plausible interpretation of our findings is certainly that sellers in the subjective group have more self-serving notions of fairness than do sellers in the objective group. At the same time, there are several important differences between our experiment and that of Babcock et al. (1995) . In our experiment it is easy for the proposer to compute the "Archimedean outcome"; in the pre-trial negotiation it is very far from obvious what the fair outcome really is. In our experiment impartiality may lead both to more modest proposals (in the case of low contribution costs) and to less modest proposals (in the case of high contribution costs); in the pre-trial negotiation impartiality always entails modesty.
In the future it would be interesting to investigate more precisely the effect of impartiality on fairmindedness. Konow (2000) argues that individuals choose beliefs about fairness to reduce cognitive dissonance (the cost of deviating from the perceived fair allocation). Applied to our experiment his theory predicts that subjects in the subjective group will form beliefs about fairness that deviates from the equal split in order to reduce cognitive dissonance. In the objective group the beliefs are formed before the subject knows their roles and will therefore be unbiased and correspond to the equal split, leading to greater costs in terms of cognitive dissonance of deviating from the equal split. Our results are consistent with Konow's theory, but they could also be driven by stronger preferences for fairness per se in the objective group. That is, all sellers may agree on the location of the fair allocation, but impartial sellers may have acquired a stronger aversion to deviations from the fair outcome.
More work is needed to discriminate between these hypotheses. 
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